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ABSTRACT

Specialization:

Although Egypt experienced an unprecedented wave of political violence post-2011,
terrorism in the North Sinai province is distinct in terms of sheer numbers, lethality,
operational sophistication, and the range of actors involved in carrying out attacks. The
objective of this paper is to provide an empirical explanation for why terrorism in
Northern Sinai started earlier, lasted longer, was more frequently claimed, and was simply
more deadly than in other Egypt provinces. The paper utilizes in-depth interviews with
representatives of NGOs in Northern Sinai, journalists, residents, and security officials,
as well as socio-economic data, terrorist incidents, and counter-terrorism operations to
analyze the trends that have emerged since 2013. Initial conclusions suggest that
ungovernability increases the opportunity of terror, but selective state presence, provides
the trigger for escalation. For the sake of enriching the literature, this paper provides an
analytical explanatory framework that expands the concept of ungovernability to include
measures of relative depravation and repression.
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I. Introduction
Historically, the Sinai Peninsula was considered the center of conflict between Egypt and Israel;
these tensions subsided after the Peace Treaty in 1979. Immediately after the Egyptian revolution
in 2011, North Sinai province witnessed an escalated wave of terrorism by different extremist
militant groups (Tuitel, 2013; Said & Elkady, 2013, p.5). More than fifteen extremist militant
groups were formed in North Sinai (Siboni, G., & Barak, 2014, p. 6). Immediately, after the ousting
of Islamist President Mursi in July 2013, the level of terrorist attacks in North Sinai has become
severe (Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 5). Notably, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Sinai
Peninsula, where the peninsula witnessed the first wave of terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2006
in South Sinai (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 3-4).
The academic literature regarding the causal explanations of terrorism encompasses
poverty, political repression, transitional democracy, relative deprivation, clash of civilization,
ungoverned space, and contagion theory. This study conducts an analytical review of those causal
explanations to analyze their relevance to the case study of North Sinai; and accordingly, the
conceptual framework and methodology are demarcated.

II. Research Problem
Since the two political transitions in 2011 and 2013, Egypt experienced different forms of political
violence and terrorism phenomena. The terrorist attacks that took place in Greater Cairo,
Alexandria, Western Desert, Fayoum, Beni Suef, and Sharqia have seen a decline (TIMEP, 2015j,
p. 9), while North Sinai (in the cities of Rafah, Sheikh Zewaid, and Al-Arish) experienced a
growing cycle and speedy increase of terrorism, particularly against the state security
establishments, state institutions, international forces, and infrastructure - see figures 1 & 2
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP,
2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015d, P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f,
P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5).
Although the outer look at the terrorism curve in Egypt’s North Sinai explains that the
terrorist attacks are the results of ousting the Islamist former President Mursi in 2013, this does
not explain the rise of terrorist attacks before and under Mursi’s rule as well as the escalation of
terror in comparison to other Egypt’s regions, especially in late 2014 and 2015 - see figure 1
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP,
2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015d, P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f,
P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5). Therefore, the objective of
this paper is to provide an empirical explanation for why terrorism in Northern Sinai started earlier,
lasted longer, was more frequently claimed, and was simply more deadly than in other Egyptian
provinces.
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Figure 1
Number of Terrorists Attacks in North Sinai (2011-2015)

Sources: The data are collected by the author from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015a, pp. 2, 8-9; TIMEP, 2015b, P. 9; TIMEP, 2015c, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015d,
P. 2; TIMEP, 2015f, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015g, P. 8; TIMEP, 2015h, P. 12; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5

Figure 2
Percentage of Total Target Type of the Terrorist Attacks in North Sinai (2011- 2014)

Sources: The figure is calculated by the author using the source of National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism, 2016.
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III. Literature Review on the Causal Explanation of Terrorism
The existing literature on terrorism has multiple explanations for its causes, including poverty,
regime type, relative deprivation, clash of civilizations, and ungoverned space. Some literature on
the poverty explanation perceives a correlation with terrorism (Taspinar, 2009, pp. 1-2; Schmid,
2011, p. 249), whilst others refuted this correlation (Hundley, 2011, p. 19; Piazza, 2009, pp. 406416; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002, pp. 1061-1062; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003, pp. 119-144).
Although, poverty exists in the case of North Sinai, but also many other Egyptian regions
experience poverty and do not experience the same scale and scope of violence as in North Sinai.
The cultural and globalization explanation perceives extremists Jihadist terror as the result
of the disparity created by globalization as well as the difference between cultures and religions,
in which the terror is used as a tool to produce changes in the US policy in the Middle East
(Hundley, 2011, p. 20; Matusitz, 2013, pp. 12-14). Attacks on Egypt’s Sinai could be explained in
this frame only if US-Egypt cooperation and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty drive attacks. This
treaty could explain why terror is concentrated in Northern Sinai, but not the rise in 2011 and 2013.
The regime type explanation of terrorism perceives that the democratic political system
establishes an inclusive and functional political system, which can reduce the frustration that may
foster terrorism (Lia, B. & Skolberg, 2004, pp. 34-39; Kaye, 2008, p. 163; Bandyopadhyay &
Younas, 2011, pp. 171-175). Another piece of literature demonstrates that that countries
experience a middle level of political freedom or democratic transitions are those more likely to
experience a high level of terrorism (Abadie, 2006, pp. 1-9; Lia and Skolberg, 2004, pp. 34-39,
71). Accordingly, the regime type explanations offer little insight to explain the case of North Sinai
as there were spikes of terror in the 1980s and 1990s on Egypt’s mainland (Awad & Hashem,
2015, p. 7), but there was neither change in regime type nor political transition.
Other scholars argue that the causes of terrorism must be seen in a multi-dimensional
framework, which includes socio-economic and political deprivation as a cause of terrorism.
Abject poverty might not be a condition for breeding terrorism, but instead when the negative
social, political, and economic relative deprivation converge may cause radicalism and terrorism
phenomenon gets higher probability to ensue (Taspinar, 2009; Dias & Bravo, 2006, pp. 329-341;
Davis, 1999). This deprivation is not absolute, but relative to those excluded groups from the state
apparatus, who might use violence as a means to revenge or change their economic and political
status (Matusitz, 2013, pp. 15-16; Güre, 2009, pp. 1-24; Piazza, 2011, pp. 339-353; Piazza, 2012,
pp. 521–546; Choi & Piazza, 2014, pp. 1-27; Cinar, 2010, pp. 56-57; Lia, B. & Skolberg, 2004;
Schmid, 2011, p. 249). Given the known political and socio-economic gaps between North Sinai
and the rest of Egypt’s regions, the relative depravation thesis has merit; however, has not been
systematically explored.
A final causal explanation of terrorism with relevance to North Sinai is the notion that
ungoverned spaces provide both grievance and opportunity for extremism to take hold.
Ungoverned spaces do not merely space deficient from governance; instead, they are spaces where
state control has been willingly or unwillingly yielded to or shared with actors not legally
recognized as sovereign authorities such as tribes or insurgents; hence, these spaces are
‘differently’ governed. These spaces have social, economic, and political dimensions in which the
exercise of sovereignty is not effective, and the state authority and functions are absent, weak, or
Published by Arab Journals Platform
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contested (Clunan & Trinkunas, 2010, p.17; Keister, 2014, p. 2; Swart, 2011, p. 44). Thus,
ungoverned spaces provide a haven for extremist militants to operate as well as a fertile ground
for the recruitment of uneducated and disadvantaged youth (Swart, 2011, p. 4; Bubalo, 2014, pp.
6-7; Abdel-Fattah, 2015, p. 26; Alterman, 2014, p. 2; Taspinar, 2009, p. 82).
Reviewing the literature about the causes of terrorism makes a hypothesis that both
ungovernability and relative deprivation hold the most explanatory power for the case in North
Sinai. Meanwhile, the existing scholarly literature is still underdeveloped in providing an
analytical explanatory process of the relationship between ungovernability, relative deprivation,
and terrorism. This invites a need for closer investigation of the case study of North Sinai to
empirically explore the process of how the ungovernability dimensions and relative deprivation
could generate terrorism through an interpretive case study approach.

IV. Research Design
i.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptualization of the case study of North Sinai is based on the four ungovernability
dimensions, relative depravation theory, and the concept of state repression. Ungovernability is
defined through four dimensions that are explained by the Rand Corporation study on “ungoverned
territories”. These dimensions are a lack of state penetration into society, a monopoly on the use
of force, control over borders, and external interference. These four dimensions cover the social,
economic, and political dimensions; meanwhile, they consist of specific indicators that can be
measured (Rabasa & Peters, 2007).
The first dimension is the State Penetration into Society, which evaluates the state
presence, weakness, or absence of the state institutions, including welfare institutions such as
health and education institutions. Moreover, it evaluates the power, authority, and legitimacy of
the state institutions in comparison to other social institutions (tribes or clans). The state
penetration into society is reflected in the degree of state authority to conduct law enforcement and
compliance. For the sake of measuring and analyzing the state penetration into society, RAND
defined three main indicators: Physical Infrastructure (“the physical dimension of the state’s
presence in a space”), the Corruption and the Prevalence of the Informal Economy, and the Social
and Cultural Resistance to Penetration by State Institutions (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 7-13). In
this dimension, the paper uses the relative deprivation theory as well and its relation to political
violence that is defined by Gur as ‘actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value
expectations and their value capabilities. The tension that develops from a discrepancy between
the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value of satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence” (Gurr,
1970, pp. 23-24). Based on the relative deprivation theory and its further enhancements, this paper
uses the concept of State Repression as the case study of North Sinai provides evidence of state
repression. This concept is defined as “it involves the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions
against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, to impose a cost
on the target as well as deter specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to
government personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport, 2007, p. 2).
The second dimension is the Monopoly on the Use of Force, in spaces like remote areas
where the state reach is weak, alternatives to this state monopoly emerge. Three main indicators
measure this dimension: the Presence of Organized Armed Groups outside the State’s Control, the
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Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist or Insurgent Groups, and the Population with
Access to Weapons (Rabasa & Peters, 2007, pp. 9-10).
The third dimension is Control over borders, in which most of the ungoverned spaces are
always located in remote or border areas. States have challenges to control borders when extended
tribes exist on both sides of borders or there are difficulties in achieving cooperation with the
neighboring states. Insurgent or terrorist groups use the borders to move, trade and receive inputs
(Rabasa & Peters, 2007, p. 12).
The fourth one is the External Interference, in the context of ungovernability, external
interference means a direct or indirect interference by external power (commonly a bordering state)
to exercise some political and economic control over the space. This occurs when an exterior power
perceives a power vacuum and moves to fill it. In return, the external interference impedes the
state’s ability to control this space. The external interference not solely measures the role of these
external actors, but also their ability to influence the internal dynamics within the state (Rabasa &
Peters, 2007, pp. 12-13).
ii.

Methodology

The Data Collection depends on both primary and secondary data resources. The primary resource
includes conducting twenty in-depth interviews in a semi-structured approach with local citizens
and Bedouins from North Sinai province, journalists who report from Sinai, government officials,
academic scholars, and researchers. Primary resources also include terrorist incidence in North
Sinai by depending on reliable database websites such as the START Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) as well as Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP). The secondary resources
include books, previous academic studies, policy papers, reports, governmental database websites,
and published interviews with the population of North Sinai.
There is no consensus on the terrorism concept neither on the policymaking side nor on the
academic side. After analyzing the various concepts of terrorism, the author found that many
conceptions are very ambiguous and some of them are defined according to particular cases of
terrorism. Hence, this paper uses the definition of GTD which defines terrorism as "the threatened
or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic,
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (“Data Collection Methodology”,
n.d.). This definition is clear and consistent with the literature.
Regarding the Data Analysis and study approach, this study uses the interpretive process
tracing approach, which allows using the concepts/themes in the outlined conceptual framework
as a chain to explain the collected data on how ungovernability dimensions interact and produce
terrorism. Furthermore, this study uses some basic descriptive statistical methods to show the
terrorism curve, causality curve, target types, and attacks by groups.

V. First Dimension of Ungovernability: Measurement of the Egyptian
Monopoly on the Use of Force and Its Interconnectedness to Terrorism
i.

First Indicator: Presence of Extremist Militant Groups in North Sinai

The first presence of the extremist militant groups in North Sinai started with the emergence of the
Tawhid Wal-Jihad group that conducted different activities between 2004-2006; the police were
Published by Arab Journals Platform
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able to suppress this group by the end of 2006 (“Al Tawhid Wal Jihad”, n.d.). Between 2011 and
2016, more than fifteen extremist groups (ex: Sinai Province of the Islamic State – SPIS, Al-Qaeda
in the Sinai Peninsula, Majlis Shura Al-Mujahideen, Army of Islam, Jund Al-Islam approximately 2,000 militants) were formed and started operations. The members of these groups
include radicalized Bedouins (especially from Tarabeen and Sawarka tribes), Salfi extremists
affiliated to other extremist groups in Gaza, escaped and released extremist prisoners (took North
Sinai as a safe haven), militants from Hamas, foreign fighters with Arab and African nationalities,
Egyptian Jihadists who spent time in Afghanistan and returned after 2012, and some criminal
smugglers who turned into terrorist groups (Alexandrani, 2015, p. 2; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 3244; Dentice, & Paolo, 2014, pp. 78-80; Gaub, 2015, p. 3; Gold, 2014, pp. 7-8; Yaari, 2012, p. 2;
Pelham, 2012b, pp.3-4; Reuters/Stringer, 2014, pp. 2-4; Benari, 2012; a former deputy head of the
Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; A Bedouin teacher
from Al-Sawarka tribe and a prominent member in a developmental NGO based in North Sinai,
personal communication, February 4, 2016; A former governor of North Sinai, personal
communication, February 6, 2016).
▪

The Monopoly on the Use of Force Post 2011 Revolution: Comparing the State
versus the Extremist Militant Groups Strength

There was a weakness of the Egyptian monopoly on the use of force post-2011 revolution until
mid-2013 in favor of the extremist militant groups. Since 2015 the military achieved predominance
over the militant groups as the number of casualties is much higher on the militant side in
comparison to casualties on the security forces’ side as a result of the counter-terrorism campaign
by the Egyptian military - see figures 3 and 4 (Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 4; Isaac,
2016, pp. 89-110; Ralph, 2012; Halawi, 2011). This does mean the deterrence of those militant
groups as the terrorist attacks still occur in North Sinai due to two challenges. First, the issue of
the Egyptian monopoly on the use of force in North Sinai province is not limited to cities like AlArish and the main roads, but the poor villages in Sheikh Zwaid, Al-Hasana, Al-Nekhl, Mehdiya,
Madfuna, and Nage Shibana that are considered the hub of militants (A former deputy head of the
Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; Sabry, 2015, pp.
203-230). The second one is the invisibility of the militants, which hide betamongtizens as many
of them come from local tribes. A militant from the Sinai Province of the Islamic State (SPIS) said,
“At the start of the fighting we used to hide in mountains, but now we are present in the villages
among residents, because it is safer there” (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 3).
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Figure 3
Comparing the Militant Attacks versus the Egyptian Security Forces Attacks (2011-2015)

Source: Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p.4

Figure 4
Comparing the Casualties among Extremist Militant Groups and Egyptian Security Forces
(2011-2015)

Sources: Isaac, 2016, pp. 89-110; Ralph, 2012; Halawi, 2011

ii.

Second Indicator: North Sinai’s Bedouins with Access to Weapons

The population’s access to weapons reflects the weakness of the state monopoly on the use of
force. The prevalence of weapons among Bedouins is very common in the Sinai Peninsula. As the
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state presence is weak in North Sinai, the Bedouins used to possess weapons to protect their lands
and property, which led to a proliferation of weapons among Bedouins (A former deputy head of
the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016). The Bedouins’
possession of weapons reflects the State of Nature according to Hobbes when there was no state,
and everyone should protect his property. Furthermore, as any economic property requires security
protection, the proliferation of tunnels post 2007 not only increased the quantity and quality of
weapons as a result of arms smuggling, but it has urged the need for smugglers to increase their
level of armament to protect these tunnels (A female human rights activist and resident in North
Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015).
During the 2011 revolution, the level of violence by Bedouins against police and security
establishments was higher than in other Egypt’s provinces because North Sinai is an armed society
(Hauslohner, 2013). Therefore, the Bedouins’ accessibility to weapons affected negatively on the
state’s monopoly on the use of force, and in return increased the state’s inability to govern
effectively.
iii.

Third Indicator: Presence of Criminal Networks Linked to Terrorist Groups

Among the indicators of the weakness of monopoly on the use of force is the presence of criminal
networks linked to terrorist groups. The fusion of identities and interdependent interests between
the smuggler Bedouins and extremist militant groups happened due to numerous factors (Pelham,
2012b, p.14). Initially, some of those who are part of the extremist militant groups were originally
smugglers, such as Shadi-Manei, the former leader of the SPIS group (Z. Gold, personal
communication, December 2, 2015). Furthermore, both Bedouins smugglers and militants have an
interdependent relationship in the arms smuggling process through the underground tunnels (O.
Al-Salami, personal communication, November 28, 2015; Anonymous political researcher
specialized in security studies, personal communication, February 3, 2016).
Most notably, both Bedouin smugglers and militants have interests in no state control. An
indicator that interprets the increase of terror post ousting Mursi, the smugglers enjoyed the
anarchy that prevailed under Mursi’s rule and his passivity towards the underground tunnels to
support Hamas, and the counter-terrorism campaign against the underground tunnels post-July
2013 affected them negatively as it devastated their business (Hauslohner, 2013). Therefore, the
possibility of cooperation between the smuggler Bedouins and militants increased post the counterterrorism campaign as currently, both shared a common enemy ‘state’s security apparatus. For
instance, the smugglers who killed some Egyptian border security guards are not extremist
militants (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 106). This gives an indicator that the smuggler Bedouins are not
solely cooperating with militants in smuggling weapons but also indicates the involvement of
smuggler Bedouins in terrorist activities as their economic interest is under threat by the
government.
Hence, the terrorist attacks by the extremist militant groups, Bedouins’ accessibility to
weapons, and the linkage between criminal smuggler networks indicate the weakness of the state
monopoly on the use of force. One might conclude that the weakness of monopoly on the use of
force has deteriorated further as a result of the weakness of state penetration into North Sinai
society.
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VI. Second Dimension of Ungovernability: State Penetration into North Sinai
Society
i.

First Indicator: Weakness of Physical Presence of the State and Relative
Deprivation of Bedouins

The state penetration into North Sinai society was very limited economically, socially, and
politically. Since the restoration of the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, Egypt planned to achieve
development in the region, but only the private sector-led development in South Sinai, whilst North
Sinai province was left underdeveloped. It is neither equipped with agriculture nor industry
infrastructure, in addition to the absence of urban transportation facilities that can connect North
Sinai to the other Nile Valley provinces (Holt-Ivry, 2014, p. 8; Yaari, 2012, pp. 11-12; Dyer &
Kessler, 2014, p. 21; Pelham, 2012a, p. 17).
The weakness of the physical presence of the state has caused a combined feeling of socioeconomic and political relative deprivation among Bedouins. Socio-economically, North Sinai is
considered the poorest border province, among the four poorest provinces in Egypt, and contains
26 out of 1,000 poorest villages in Egypt (Social Fund for Development, 2013, p. 26 & Sadeany,
2014). Bedouins have a distinct identity that is oriented eastward than the rest of Egypt, and their
identity crisis was intensified by their marginalization from the state development projects,
exclusion from public sector jobs such as police and army, land property right, and most
considerably Egypt’s central government perception to them as spies of Israel, smugglers, and
recently as terrorists. This untrusted government’s perception led to politically depriving local
Bedouins of the participation in the state policymaking process (A female human rights activist
and resident in North Sinai, personal communication, November 30, 2015; A prominent member
of Al-Sawarka tribe, Personal communication, November 30, 2015; Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.3-4;
Joya, & Gormus, 2015, pp. 52-53; Pelham, 2012b, p. 2; A former deputy head of the Egyptian
Intelligence Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; K. Dawoud, personal
communication, December 1, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 3-19; Yaari, 2012, p. 12;
O. Al-Salami, personal communication, November 28, 2015; Walton, Gerges, & Gilbert, 2012, p.
7).
ii.

Second Indicator: The Prevalence of Corruption and Underground Economy

The lack of physical presence of state and socio-economic underdevelopment situation created a
prevalence of corruption and complex networks of the underground economy including human
trafficking and all sorts of smuggling through digging underground tunnels between North Sinai
and Gaza Strip. Notably, this constituted the main source of Bedouins’ income and has developed
the livelihood of People in North Sinai (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). The Sawarka (extends in AlArish, Rafah, and Shaykh Zuweid cities), Tarabeen (the most populous tribe and extends alongside
the Egypt-Gaza border) and Rumaylat tribes mainly manage the smuggling operations. These
commercial ties between the North Sinai Bedouins and people in Gaza Strip were reinforced by
historical, ethnic, and linguistic ties (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 1-5; Gold, 2013, pp. 3-4). The lack of
state penetration into society has introduced a new issue of control over borders.
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Figure 5
Map of Tribes in the Sinai Peninsula

Source: Watanabe, 2015, p.2

During the proliferation of the underground tunnels, the state was present but was corrupt.
The Egyptian State Security Investigations Service (SSI) allowed the smugglers to operate under
the condition of having a balanced relationship with the state authority. A former governor of
North Sinai said, “The SSI left the smugglers and jihadists as part of a deal: we will not harm you
as long as you don’t harm us” (Personal communication, February 6, 2016). The state perceived
that using repression complemented by allowing the underground tunnels was the most suitable
approach to maintaining security in the tribal border area as the state found that from 2006 until
2011 the Sinai Peninsula was fully secured and free of terrorism (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108). Hence,
it is obvious that the state followed the traditional concept of national security that includes the
security sector only, rather than, the comprehensive concept that encompasses not only the security
sector, but also the social, economic, and political ones.
Therefore, the lack of psychical presence of the state, as well as lack of control over
borders, led to a proliferation of underground economy that eroded further the state penetration
into society. Meanwhile, it seems that the state was satisfied by the underground economy as it
lifted a heavy financial burden of development away from the state’s shoulder. The population and
tribes were considered the main beneficiaries of these tunnels and shutting down of these tunnels
created a threat to their livelihood.
iii.

Third Indicator: Social and Cultural Resistance to Penetration by State
Institutions - State Legitimacy and Authority versus other Social Institutions

The socio-economic and political relative deprivation among Bedouins has caused social and
cultural resistance to penetration by state institutions in North Sinai society. The state never held
legitimate authority over the peninsula, but other informal social institutions conduct ‘gap-filling’
(Joya, & Gormus, 2015, p. 52; K. Dawoud, personal communication, December 1, 2015; A.
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Schleifer, personal communication, November 25, 2015; Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38).
a) State’s Proxy Governance: Tribal or Urf Law and Legitimacy of Tribal Leaders
Since the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the traditional form of social governance in North Sinai is
the ‘Urf law’ (Gold, 2013, p.9). Based on different interviews conducted by the author, it is found
that the state neither has had legitimacy in this tribal society nor the state law exceeded the strength
of the Urf law. A former governor of North Sinai said, “if a Bedouin conducts an act against the
law and sentenced five years by the state law, this would not excuse him from fulfilling the tribal
jurisdiction, he should be presented in front of Urf jurisdiction also” (Personal communication,
February 6, 2016). In the same context, a former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence
Directorate said, “The police and judges represent nothing for Bedouins” (Personal
communication, March 13, 2016). As the Urf law does not contradict the state law, the state was
able to conduct Proxy Governance in North Sinai by informally appointing the elder tribal leaders
who used to keep law and order in the province (Revkin, 2014, pp. 34-38; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85108; Gold, 2013, p.9). After the extremist terrorist attacks from 2004-to 2006, the state went further
and supported the Urf law, and gave salaries to Urf judges, which made the Urf law more
institutionalized. Therefore, the tribal leaders/Urf law represented the social institution that has
more legitimacy over the state legitimacy, and this facilitated the state’s presence in society, but
through the proxy form of governance.
b) The Fall Down of State’s Proxy Governance and Emergence of Smugglers as the
New Tribal Elite
The rise of the smuggling business in North Sinai has caused a shift in the tribal society, in which
the power and legitimacy of the elder tribal leaders have eroded in favor of the new tribal elite ‘the
smugglers’ who have money, power, and weapons. The youth Bedouins started to perceive those
elder tribal leaders as appointed government officials who are not able to fulfill their needs.
Consequently, those new tribal smugglers elite were able to impose leverage on the youth
Bedouins. (A former governor of North Sinai, personal communication, February 6, 2016; Gold,
2014, p. 7; Z.; Sabry, 2015, pp. 203-230; Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and Researcher
specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015).
Although before the 2011 revolution, the state legitimacy was fragile, but it was able to govern
North Sinai through the tribal leaders and Urf law. Post-2011 revolution, the legitimacy, and upper
hand were neither in the hands of the state nor Urf law, but it has become concentrated in hands
of the new smuggler elite.
c) Emergence of Non-State Sharia Courts of North Sinai
In addition to the rise of new smugglers’ tribal elite post-20111 revolution, there was a change in
North Society through the emergence of non-state Sharia courts that seized more power and
influence as a result of the weakness of both Urf law and state legitimacy. These courts were
operated by Sinai Salafist Sheikhs (or Sharia judges as they describe themselves), who reject the
Egyptian legal system even under Mursi’s rule. They are self-appointed and self-trained; their
ideology is based on Salafism, and their jurisdiction is based on the Sharia law. Those Salafist
judges operated underground between the 1990s and 2000s, and roughly fourteen Sharia courts
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started to emerge publicly and seize more influence after 2011. The people in North Sinai started
to resort to these courts instead of resorting to Urf judges or the legal state court system, as the
Bedouins perceived Sharia judges as less corrupt than the tribal judges (Revkin, 2013, Revkin,
2015, pp. 11-16). Although these courts lack the enforcement mechanism, since they operate in a
tribal society that is based on collectivism principles, they were using other powerful tools such as
social pressure and intimidation (Revkin, 2015, p. 11).
Since 2013, the government has launched arrest campaigns against those Sharia judges
(Revkin, 2013). Those Sharia judges rejected June 30 revolution and perceived the counterterrorism campaigns in North Sinai as an organized state crime that would generate more revenge
attitude against the government (Revkin, 2015). Sheikh Hamdeen Abu Faisal, Sharia Judge said,
“There is a long line of people seeking revenge” (Revkin, 2014, pp. 43-44). Therefore, unlike the
Urf law which does not encourage this violent extremism, the rise of non-state Sharia courts eroded
the state proxy governance institution and facilitated the spread of radical ideology among the
North Sinai population.
iv.

The Nexus between Selective State Penetration into North Sinai Society, Relative
Deprivation and Radicalization

The case of North Sinai reflects a wide extent that the major cause of radicalization and joining
the extremist militant group is not solely due to poverty, but due to the feeling of relative
deprivation combined with a selective state penetration that is resembled state repression.
Exceptionally in some incidence, the use of violence against the state in North Sinai could be as a
result of the relative deprivation or state repression solely, but commonly the use of violence by
Bedouins against the state is as a result of combined relative deprivation and selective state
penetration.
According to the anthropological studies on the Sinai Bedouins community, the dominant
thought was either Sufism or atheism, but the Jihadism ideology did not exist. It is even
contradictory to the tribal thoughts, culture, and values. The first two radicalized Bedouins were
the Bedouin dentist Khaled Messad (from the Sawarka tribe) and (Nasser al-Mallahi SinaiPalestinian); both formed the Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad group. Due to lack of state penetration into
society and relative deprivation among youth Bedouins, Messad gained influence through
preaching in mosques and promoting the jihadi ideology; and succeeded to recruit around 40
Bedouins from his Masaaid clan, Tarabeen tribe as well as from other impoverished villages in
Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah. In 2004, Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad group formed and conducted different
terrorist attacks 2004-2006 in South Sinai (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 4; Yaari, 2012, p.
5; Sabry, 2015, pp. 125-130; “Al Tawhid Wal Jihad”, n.d.; “Tawhid Wal-Jihad”, 2014).
Post the terrorist attacks of 2004, the state started to penetrate selectively in North Sinai
society by conducting state repression, in which the state attempted to get authority over the region
through harsh security measures rather than confronting the radical ideologies and developing the
province. The only presence of the state was in form of state repression by the Egyptian State
Security Investigations Service (SSI) under the emergency law (Joya, & Gormus, 2015, pp. 52-53;
Pelham, 2012a, p.2; Pelham, 2012b). The SSI started a massive campaign and arrested 3,000
detainees (as estimated by Human Rights Watch) from North Sinai, and some claimed being
tortured during the investigation as well as arresting family members of suspected terrorists as
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means for obtaining confessions (Siboni & Barak, 2014, pp. 4-5; Gold, 2014, pp. 6-7; Pelham,
2012a, p. 3; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-08; International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 3-4). According to the
interviews conducted by the author, it is found a consensus that this approach kept security in Sinai
between 2007 to 2011, but it did not enhance the state penetration into society; ironically, the
combined feeling of state repression and relative deprivation have breaded more a sort of
radicalization among tribe members, especially the youth who wanted to get revenge from the
state. This facilitated the emergence of the Salfi associations in Rafah, Sheikh Zewaid, and Bir AlAbd. The spread of radical ideology was clear in the way the youth Bedouins dress, their
disobedience to the tribal leaders, their boycott of the Egyptian government officials, and their
campaign to promote the Jihadi ideology. An anonymous Bedouin said, “Every tribe and family
in the Sinai saw a number of its youth joining these Salafi trends.” (Yaari, 2015, p. 5).
Following the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, the selective state penetration that was
resembled in SSI’s collapse and this jihadi ideology has transformed into terror against the state.
However, the population across Egypt used violence against the police in 2011, but North Sinai
was among the top places that witnessed violence as a result of selective state penetration feeling.
Many armed Bedouins conducted violent acts in Al-Arish city, blocked roads, and participated in
gas pipeline bombings. Many spaces like Wadi Amr and Jabal al-Halal turned into defense bases
for extremist Bedouins, especially for those extremist Bedouins who escaped during the prison
break in 2011 and had already interacted with a lot of jihadists in the prison; among them the
former leader of ABM, Tawfiq Farqik Ziada from Sawarka tribe (A. Sakr, personal
communication, November 11, 2015; Sabry, 2015, pp. 1-30; Al-Yaari, 2012; p.8; Anonymous EXRadical Islamist and Researcher specialized in the Islam Militant Movements, personal
communication, November 30, 2015). The economic targeting of the gas pipeline by Bedouins
resembled a clear case of relative deprivation. The security guard of the gas pipeline in North Sinai
said that there were five masked men and the one who spoke had a native Bedouin accent saying,
“This has nothing to do with you, leave right now, or you will be shot” (Sabry, 2015, pp. 31-50).
Moreover, a tribal elder said that it is impossible for a stranger to conduct these terrorist attacks
without the help of local Bedouins (Sabry, 2015, pp. 31-50). Thus, both the relative deprivation
and selective state penetration have caused radicalization among some Bedouins, which resulted
in the terror against the Egyptian state.
The initiation of the counter-terrorism campaign post-July 2013 represented another phase
of selective state penetration. The Bedouins suffered from suspicious treatment by the security
forces. A Bedouin from the Al-Sawarka tribe said, “Everyone from Rafah and Sheikh Zewaid in
the eye of the army is a terrorist unless you prove the opposite” (Personal communication, February
4, 2016). In some cases, the military airstrikes hurt civilians and their properties (Reuters/Stringer,
2014, p. 3; El-Fekki, Fahmy, & Nader, 2015; Mehmood, 2015, pp. 13-14). Moreover, the counterterrorism campaign closed the underground tunnels that represented the main source of many
Bedouins’ income.
The expansion of the buffer zone in Rafah and demolishment of citizens’ houses and
cultivated lands have intensified the feeling of relative deprivation among the inhabitants as the
demolishment made no distinction between the houses that operate tunnels and others that are free
of tunnels. Thousands of inhabitants left their homes, and some of them resorted to living in tents
until they receive their compensation and find alternative housing. Many inhabitants found the
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compensation is not adequate to buy a new house. Moreover, the increased demand for housing
by the displaced inhabitants in Rafah increased the housing prices. Additionally, the government
did not compensate people for the cultivated lands as it considered them empty lands. Many people
suffered the loss of income that is connected to their place, especially those who have cultivated
lands (Houry & Porteous, 2015; A prominent member of Al-Sawarka tribe, Personal
communication, November 30, 2015; Personal communication, February 4, 2016; Y. Werdany,
personal communication, February 3, 2015).
The selective state penetration post-July 2013 through the counter-terrorism campaign
increased the feeling of revenge and relative deprivation. A Bedouin teacher from the Sawarka
tribe said, “Radicalization is prevalent among youth, you could see in one house, one member
supports the army, and another supports the extremist militants” (Personal communication,
February 4, 2016). These extremist militant groups were able to conduct recruitment from Sinai
youth Bedouins, especially from Sawarka and Tarabeen tribes (“Confessions of arrested terrorists
in the Sinai”, 2013; “Confession of the traitor Ahmed Salama about his work with the terrorists”,
2015; Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 6; M. Salah, personal communication, November 30,
2015; S. Issac, personal communication, December 8, 2015; Y. Werdany, personal
communication, February 3, 2015). An anonymous security officer in North Sinai said that a
militant interrogating him said that he participated in violence against the security forces as he
wanted to take revenge from the security forces (Georgy & Woods, 2015, p.5). Before the initiation
of the counter-terrorism campaign, an anonymous Bedouin witnessed only five people in his
village fight for SPIS, but after the counter-terrorism campaign that almost destroyed 90% of his
village, he witnessed around 40 members fight for SPIS (Schenker, 2015, pp. 6-7). Although
counter-terrorism killed and arrested many militants, it has expanded the state’s enemies and
established a base of recruitment where the militants can employ many repressed Bedouins.
In some cases, economic relative deprivation is the only factor that is related to recruitment.
According to different residents of North Sinai and security officials, the leaders of terrorist groups
offer the young recruits’ wives, houses, and money (Reuters/Stringer, 2014, p. 4). A Bedouin
teacher from the Sawarka tribe said, “The militants used the poverty situation to recruit youth
Bedouins to place bombs, those youth are not radicalized, but like drug addicts and criminals, they
do that for money only” (Personal communication, February 4, 2016). One of the confessions by
a Bedouin terrorist who does not seem to be radicalized, called Ahmed Faraj Alkika said, “I have
been working with militant groups for nine months with a monthly salary of 10,000 Egyptian
Pounds” (“Confessions Ahmed Faraj Alkika about his work with terrorists in Sheikh Zuweid,
2015). Moreover, the SPIS group asked the harmed citizens to join the fight against the militant
groups, and they have been offering them money and donations and promised to get revenge from
the military that destroyed their property (Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and researcher
specialized in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; Shay,
2016, p. 3).
The extremist militant groups, especially SPIS were effectively offering the deprived and
suppressed youth Bedouins an identity and membership, and a means to achieve their goals, it
could be money, identity, revenge from the state, or all of it. This kind of selective state penetration
does not enhance the security situation; ironically, it increases the probability of terror to occur.
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Therefore, this paper defines the ‘Selective State Penetration into Society’ as a lack of the
state capacity and state willingness to penetrate remote regions economically and socially but
solely intervenes repressively to maintain security in the region.

VII. Third Dimension of Ungovernability: Control over Borders in North Sinai
The withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip and the winning of Hamas in the 2006 elections that
followed by the imposition a blockade over the Gaza Strip had introduced a new turning point in
losing control over borders through the flourishing of underground tunnels between the Gaza Strip
and North Sinai province. Following 2007, the legal Rafah crossing between Sinai and Gaza has
become one of the most important means for Gaza daily life needs. Shortly, the Egyptian
government started to accuse Hamas of supporting the militant groups in Sinai and using the
Peninsula as a space for the missiles testing and restricted the movement through the Rafah
crossing in 2008. Consequently, the extended tribes started to develop trade and commercial ties
with North Sinai Bedouins through constructing underground tunnels (Pelham, 2012a, pp. 10-14).
Figure 6
Number of the Underground Tunnels between Gaza and North Sinai (2007-2013)

Sources: Sabry, 2015, p.86; Shay, 2016, p.2

As it is shown in figure 6, until the mid of 2007, the underground tunnels did not exceed
20 tunnels. By October 2013, the total number of tunnels reached 1900 roughly. The first tunnels
started by 150 to 300 meters, but later some tunnels reached 1,500 meters long and 2 meters wide
(Sabry, 2015, p.85-108; Shay, 2016, p. 2) Basically, two kinds of underground tunnels were
developed. The main tunnels are considered the economic tunnels used to bring commodities,
heavy construction materials and raw materials from Egypt to Gaza. The second complex type of
underground tunnels were used by Hamas to protect itself through hiding stockpile of rockets and
launchers as well as smuggling weapons through Sinai to Gaza (Eldar, 2014; Sabry, 2015, pp. 85108).
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However, the normal path of arms trafficking had been from Sinai to Gaza, but after the
Egyptian revolution in 2011, the arms trafficking route was sometimes reversed from Gaza to Sinai
as there was a demand from the extremist militants in North Sinai (Yaari, 2012, p. 6). The tunnels
helped militants to transfer and store weapons as well as hide inside it as part of guerrilla warfare
(Anonymous EX-radical Islamist and researcher specialized in the Islam militant movements,
personal communication, November 30, 2015; Z. Gold, personal communication, December 2,
2015; Hassan, Bayoumy, & Woods, 2015, p. 3).
In 2009 (under pressure of US and Israel) and in early August 2012, Egypt started to raid
the tunnels, but both campaigns were ineffective as the tunnels were more sophisticated, longer
and deeper than the campaign targeted (Gold, 2014, pp. 12-13; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, p. 18). A
former governor of North Sinai said, “The state did not allow the smuggling operations, at the time
I was the Commander of the Egyptian Border Guards Force, and we destroyed every tunnel we
knew, but the problem is that tunnels were developed and built inside private houses of Bedouins”
(Personal communication, February 6, 2016). Thus, this does not solely reflect the degree of lack
of the Egyptian state control over borders, but it shows as well lack of psychical presence of state
that pushed the citizens to resort to the underground economy that in turn led to the weakness of
state penetration into society and weakness of control over borders.
One of the most important indicators of a state control over borders is its ability to
coordinate with the neighboring authorities ‘Hamas and Israel’. There has been an unprecedented
coordination between Israel and Egypt since July 2013 as both under threat from the extremist
militant groups. As Israeli official put it “We coordinate when it comes to activities near the
(border) fence in order to prevent terrorist attacks potentially spreading into Israel” (Georgy &
Woods, 2015, p. 4). Meanwhile, it is found unprecedented weakness of cooperation between Egypt
and Hamas in securing borders since July 2013, as Egypt considers Hamas an extension of its
enemy “Muslim Brotherhood. A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence Directorate said,
“There is no coordination with Hamas as it keeps threatening Egypt’s national security (Personal
communication, March 13, 2016). Moreover, it seems that the war against the tunnels has
deteriorated further Hamas-Egypt relations. Specifically, raiding tunnels puts legitimacy of Hamas
in Gaza under doubts, as it would not be able to deliver goods to Gaza citizens.
Therefore, the weakness of control over borders is a result of weakness of state penetration
into society and lack of monopoly on the use of force. However, the state started to resume control
over borders since July 2013, but the weakness to control borders between 2007 and 2013
increased the level of ungovernability, that in return increased the level of armament of the local
militant groups as well as opened the floor for external interference by different non-state actors
to gain leverage and power in North Sinai province.

VIII. Fourth Dimension of Ungovernability: External Interference
The figure 7 explains that the weakness of state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly
on the use of force, and weakness of control over borders eased the external interference by
different non-state actors. The Israeli external influence through Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
affected negatively on Egypt’s monopoly on the use force; in return, opened the floor for other
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extremist actors from Gaza Strip to interfere and fill the power vacuum. Significantly, the Middle
East regional security crisis escalated the nature and intensity of terrorism in North Sinai province
through the flow of weapon, militants and institutional linkage of SPIS group to the IS. Thus, it
seems that the seeds of North Sinai terrorism might be local, but the expansion and escalation of
terrorism in North Sinai have been reinforced by the regional determinate.
Figure 7
External Influence and Regional Dimension

Note: This figure is visualized by the author to summarize section VIII.

i.

External Influence of Israel: Restrictions of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
1979 on the Monopoly on the Use of Force

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 is a cross-section indictor between both the external
interference and monopoly on the use of force dimensions. Specifically, this treaty represents a
clear indicator of external influence by Israel as it has placed military restrictions on the Egyptian
state monopoly on the use force in Sinai territory through allowing only limited number of troops
in zone A and B, and demilitarization of zone C - see map/figure 14 (Watanabe, 2015, p. 4; “IsraelEgypt Peace Treaty”, 1979). Notably, the increase of terrorist attacks by the extremist militants
has led to increase in the coordination between Israel and Egypt, which enabled Egypt to deploy
large number of weapons that are banned by the Peace Treaty in Sinai (Aronson, 2015; Dyer, &
Kessler, 2014, pp. 19-21).
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Figure 8
Demilitarized Zones on the Sinai since 1979

Source: Watanabe, 2015

ii.

Non-State Actors in Gaza Strip and Geographical Proximity to Conflict Zone

The first external interference was resembled by Gaza extremist militant groups in Southern Gaza
that succeeded in imposing their ideological leverage over some Bedouins due to the cultural and
social linkage. In 2009, many members of Gaza extremist militant groups such as the Jaish AlIslam group were oppressed and pushed by Hamas to leave the Gaza Strip; they moved to North
Sinai, where they were able to operate and attack Israel several times more freely from Sinai, with
the understanding that Israel will not interfere militarily and fight them in Sinai due to the Peace
Treaty (Sabry, 2015, pp. 85-108; Pelham, 2012a, p. 13; Yaari, 2012, p. 6). Due to lack of state
penetration, those extremists were able to hide among citizens, especially in the villages that are
away from the state reach. The existence of extremist Bedouins in the poor villages of North Sinai
fostered the Gaza extremists’ safety through providing them by a safe haven in their villages
(Sabry, 2015, pp. 132-133). The influence of Gaza’s extremists was clear on some Sinai Bedouins
starting from 2010, in which the Sinai extremist started to preach with radical discourse in mosques
of villages surrounding Sheikh Zwaid and Rafah. Al-Filistini said, “There was nothing to counter
the radical rhetoric in Sinai, and they weren’t preaching to doctors and engineers” (Sabry, 2015,
pp. 132-133).
Notably, those extremists arrived two years before the rise of terrorism in 2011, but
throughout those two years, the Gaza extremists succeeded in achieving an impact of spreading
their ideologies and cause radicalization that has transformed into terror against the state post-2011
revolution. Moreover, the increase of ungovernability post-2011 revolution was an opportunity
exploited by both Sinai and Gaza extremists to conduct many terrorist attacks (“Confessions of
arrested terrorists in the Sinai”, 2013). Moreover, there are extremist militant groups based in both
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Sinai and Gaza such as Majlis Shura Al-Mujahideen (MSM) as well as Jaish Al-Islam that trained
some Egyptian Jihadists and was blamed in 2012 of conducting cross border attack that killed 16
soldiers (“Jaish Al-Islam”, 2014; Dyer & Kessler, 2014, pp. 35- 41; Gold, 2014,p. 9; “Majlis Shura
al-Mujahedeen”, n.d.; Maloof, 2013; Aftandilian, 2015, pp. 14-15; Shay, 2014, pp. 3-4).
The second external interference is resembled in Hamas that was able to impose its
economic and military leverage over North Sinai Bedouins; especially, this was empowered by the
historical and common family ties. Economically, Hamas succeeded to control the main income
source of inhabitants of North Sinai, which made the citizens fully dependent on the underground
tunnels. The economic benefits and clan interests allowed Hamas to make the smugglers more
loyal to it as it is the reason behind their wealth (Pelham, 2012a, p.10; Sabry, 2015, pp. 51-84).
Militarily, Hamas used Sinai as a strategic depth to store its arsenal and assets (Yaari, 2012, pp. 67). According to Omar Suliman’s testimony in Mubarak’s trial, the prison break of January 2011
that led escape of 23,710 prisoners was a result of a deal between Hamas and North Sinai Bedouins
of supplying those Bedouins by weapons, in return they help Hamas to free the Hamas imprisoned
members (Sabry, 2015, pp. 179-202). Among those prisoners, there were Egyptian jihadists
including Bedouins who took Jabel Al-Halal Mountain in North Sinai as a safe haven and started
to operate and conduct terrorist attacks against the state (Tuitel, 2013; Said & Elkady, 2013, p.5).
However, Hamas did not conduct terrorist attacks against Egypt, but its interference has increased
the ungovernability level in North Sinai, which in return facilitated the escalation of terror.
iii.

The Regional Dimension and Escalation of Terrorism in North Sinai

The eruption of the Arab spring has created a regional security crisis; it is found that North Sinai
was sharply affected by this crisis. First, there was a fall down of the authoritarian and totalitarian
regimes that were formerly able to suppress those extremist militant groups. Second, there was a
fall down of intelligence institutions that previously were coordinating with Egyptian intelligence.
Hence, all these have facilitated the flourishing, movement, training and armament of those
extremist in the region as well recruitment of new members under the slogan of ‘Jihad for the sake
of Allah’ with less oppression in spaces such as North Sinai (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p. 7; “Regional
influence on terrorism in Egypt”, 2015).
Moreover, the Middle regional security crisis post the Arab Spring has created a fragile
border security in the Arab world, in which it eased arms trafficking. The collapse of Gaddafi’s
regime and the division of the Libyan army have created many ungoverned spaces, especially in
the western part near the Egyptian-Libyan borders, in which it has become a safe haven for
terrorists training and arms smuggling to the Egyptian territory (“Regional influence on terrorism
in Egypt”, 2015; Pelham, 2012a, p.11).
The Middle East regional security crisis has resulted in movement of many foreign
extremists from Somalia, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and Eastern Mali to North
Sinai, who shared their experience with the radicalized local Bedouins (Siboni & Barak, 2014, p.
7). Moreover, many of Egyptian extremists who fought in Syria returned Egypt to represent a new
trained extremist generation who transferred their jihadi experience to the local extremist of SPIS
(Awad & Hashem, 2015, p. 21; Georgy & Woods, 2015, p. 5).
Unlike the traditional ideological link with Al-Qaeda state, in 2014 ABM (the most active
local group in North Sinai) has pledged alliance to the Islamic State (IS) (Abdo, 2014). Afterwards,
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it shifted its name from Ansar Beit Al-Maqdas (ABM) to the Sinai Province of the Islamic State
(SPIS) or Wilayat Sinai (“Ansar Beit al-Maqdis”, 2015). Shortly, it has adopted the same black
flag of the IS group, follows its same tactics as beheading of captives, and produces high quality
edited videos (Anonymous, 2014), and above all it presented videos of controlling lands that
reflects its intention to govern as the IS acted. Moreover, the application of SPIS to the regional
radical discourse facilitated getting foreign fighters and financial support from the IS group.
In the very beginning, the majority of SPIS members were Bedouins, especially from
Tarabeen tribe and Masaaid clan in Sawarka tribe as well as other extremists from different
Egyptian regions, but they started to also include extremist from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan,
Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and Somalia (Dentice, & Paolo, 2014, pp. 7880; Kovac & Guertin, 2013, p. 2).
However, ABM was willing to align with Al-Qaeda, but the IS group provided logistical
support, training, and weapons more than Al-Qaeda did (A. Sakr, personal communication,
November 11, 2015; Lister, 2016, p. 16). It is confirmed that SPIS received financial and weaponry
support from IS via the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan, Syria through the Mediterranean Sea, and on a
minor scale from the underground tunnels (A former deputy head of the Egyptian Intelligence
Directorate, personal communication, March 13, 2016; A Former Governor of North Sinai,
personal communication, February 6, 2016; A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11,
2015).
Clearly, the external interference and regional dimension have led to escalation of terrorism
intensity in North Sinai. According to figure 1, there has been an escalation of terrorism since
October-December 2014, which coincides with the declaration of ABM alliance to the IS group.
Moreover, according to figure 9 that represents number of terrorists by extremist militant groups,
during October-December 2014, there was a rise of SPIS terrorist attacks, and a decline of the
share of other groups’ terrorist attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c, P. p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6;
TIMEP, 2016, P. 5). Additionally, since declaring alliance to the IS, the most complex terrorist
activities were conducted by SPIS. For instance, in July 2015, SPIS attacked 21 security facilities
and checkpoints simultaneously that resulted in the death of dozens of Egyptian security forces.
Moreover, it claimed responsibility for bombing the Russian plane in Sinai that was carrying 224
passengers (“Wilayat Sinai - The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy”, n.d.).
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Figure 9
Number of Attacks by Extremist Militant Groups (2013-2015)

Source: The data are collected by the author from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c, P. p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6; TIMEP, 2016, P.5

Most notably, according to figure 10 (percentage of attacks by extremist militant groups),
the terrorist attacks by the groups appear as a mirror; the rise of the terrorist attacks by SPIS
coincided by a decline of terrorist attacks of the other groups (National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c; p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP,
2015g, p. 6; TIMEP, 2016, P. 5). This can confirm the argument that SPIS was able to make
alliance with all other local groups in North Sinai, except for roughly 50-60 members who rejected
the Islamic State ideology, who formed ‘Al-Morabteen Group’ under the leadership of Hisham
Ashmawy, and affiliated to Al-Qaeda (Anonymous EX-Radical Islamist and researcher specialized
in the Islam militant movements, personal communication, November 30, 2015; Awad & Hashem,
2015, p. 18; A. Sakr, personal communication, November 11, 2015). This does not reflect solely
the strength of SPIS, but it also reflects the level of armament and monetary support that were
received from the IS group. Thus, the SPIS represented a symbol of the transitional terrorism in
North Sinai.
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Figure 10
Percentage of Attacks by Extremist Militant Groups (2013-2015)

Sources: The data are collected and calculated by the author from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism, 2016; TIMEP, 2015c; p. 2; TIMEP, 2015b, p. 3; TIMEP, 2015g, p. 6; TIMEP,
2016, P.5

IX. Conclusion: Correlation between the Ungovernability and Terrorism
The key finding of this paper shows a correlation between the ungovernability dimensions and
terrorism phenomena in North Sinai province. A significant factor behind the escalation of terror
post-2011 and 2013 is that North Sinai was selectively governed space. Through employing the
different theories, concepts, and indicators, the paper developed an analytical explanatory
framework of the nexus between the ungovernability dimensions and terrorism as it is summarized
in figure 11 (This figure is not considered a new analysis or findings, but it summarizes the entire
paper through illustration). This figure explains that the ungovernability seems like a chain, in
which the fragility of one dimension causes fragility in the other dimensions. The principal
dimension that affects the other three dimensions is lack of state penetration into society.
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Figure 11
The Explanatory Analytical Framework of the Ungovernability – Terrorism Nexus (EAFUTN)

Note: This figure is developed by the author and not considered a new analysis or findings, but it summarizes the
entire paper through illustration.

First, there was lack of state penetration into North Society due to weakness of the physical
presence of the state in North Sinai. This last one has caused both relative deprivation among
Bedouins and prevalence of underground tunnels between Gaza Strip and North Sinai.
Additionally, the absence of strong state legitimacy authority has caused more social and cultural
resistance to penetration by state institutions, in favor of other social institutions including nonstate Sharia courts, new smuggler elite and extremist militant groups. Towards the end of
controlling the region at hand, the state did not have the capacity and willingness to penetrate
socially and economically, but selectively through state repression as it is less costly as it was
perceived.
Second, there was a weakness of monopoly on use of force due to the restrictions of
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty 1979, that allowed the flourishing of more than fifteen extremist
militant groups, opened the floor for Bedouins to access weapons, and created an opportunity for
cooperation between the smuggler networks and extremist militant groups as both share common
interests in arms smuggling.
Third, the weakness of both state penetration into society and monopoly on the use of force
had facilitated the lack of control over borders. The border fragility appeared in developing roughly
1,900 underground tunnels between North Sinai and Gaza Strip in the periods of 2007-2013. Thus,
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the borderland fragility allowed the flow of many extremist militants and weapons that increased
the level of ungovernability and facilitated the proliferation of the radical ideologies and terrorism.
Fourth, the weakness of state penetration into society, weakness of monopoly on the use
of force, and lack of control over borders eased the external interference by non-state actors who
successfully gained ideological, economic, and military leverage in North Sinai. However, the
external interference occurs due to the weakness of those three dimensions, but it requires conflict
borderland countries, unstable regional condition or both as in the case of North Sinai that affected
by Gaza Strip as a conflict borderland as well as the regional security crisis in the Middle East post
the Arab Spring. Remarkably, the external interference escalated the terror and caused a transition
in the nature and intensity of terror, in which transformed the terrorism from being local into
transitional one.
Therefore, based upon this case of North Sinai, this paper enriches the existing literature
through introducing an explanatory analytical framework on how the ungovernability dimensions
produce terrorism that includes a new concept of ‘Selective State Penetration’ (see figure 16).
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Güre,P. (2009). Does terrorism have economic roots?. Boston University. Available at:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?rep=rep1&type=pdf&doi=10.1.1.216.9893.
Gurr, T. (1970). Why men rebel. Princeton, N.J: Published for the Center of International Studies,
Princeton University [by] Princeton University Press.
Halawi, J. (2011, August 18). Clamp - down in Sinai. Al-Ahram Weekly Retrieved April 26, 2016
from http://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/27428.
Hassan, A., Bayoumy, Y., & Woods, R. (2015, July 15). Bedouins drawn into Egypt’s Islamist
fight. Reuters (Rep.). Retrieved April 11, 2016, from Thomson Reuters website:
http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/15/07/EGYPT-ISLAM:sinai.pdf.
Hauslohner, A. (2013, July 28). Insurgency takes root in Egypt's Sinai. Washington Post. Retrieved
April 11, 2016, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgency-takes-root-inegypts-sinai/2013/07/28/2e3e01da-f7a4-11e2-a954-358d90d5d72d_story.html.
Holt-Ivry, O. (2014). Arms control in civil society: Controlling conventional arms’ smuggling in
Sinai (A. Kurz, Ed.). In E. Landau (Ed.), Arms Control and National Security: New
Horizons, (Vol. 135, pp. 103-121). Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies.
Retrieved April 11, 2016, from http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/olivia.pdf.
Houry, N., & Porteous, T. (2015). "Look for another homeland": Forced evictions in Egypt's
Rafah.
Retrieved
February
12,
2016,
from
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/egypt0915_4up.pdf
Hundley, L. (2011). Repeated failures: Explaining the rise and tactics of the current wave of radical
Islamic
terrorism.
Retrieved
October
23,
2015,
from
http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/16-2/2-hundley.pdf.

Published by Arab Journals Platform

70

Karim Ashour: Selective State Penetration

International Crisis Group (2007). Egypt’s Sinai question. Middle East/North Africa Report, 61.
Retrieved December 7, 2015, from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle East
North Africa/North Africa/Egypt/61_egypts_sinai_question.pdf.
Isaac, S. (2016). Egypt’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts and Regional Security. FEPS-Cairo
University: Review of Economics and Political Science, 1(1), 89-110.
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. (1979, March 26). Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved
December
16,
2015,
from
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-egypt peace treaty.aspx.
Joya, A., & Gormus, E. (2015). State power and radicalization in Egypt’s Sinai. The Researcher:
The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies, 1(1), 42-50. Retrieved December 31, 2015,
from
https://www.academia.edu/16704894/State_Power_and_Radicalization_in_Egypts_Sinai.
Kaye, D. (2008). More freedom, less terror?: Liberalization and political violence in the arab
world. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved September 17, 2015, from
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG772.pdf.
Keister, J. (2014, December). The Illusion of Chaos: Why ungoverned spaces aren’t ungoverned,
and
why
that
matters.
Retrieved
October
18,
2015,
from
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa766_1.pdf.
Kovac, N., & Guertin, T. (February 2013). Armed groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Civil-Military
Fusion Centre. Retrieved February 13, 2016, from http://reliefweb.int/report/egypt/armedgroups-sinai-peninsula.
Krueger, A. B., & Maleckova, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal
connection?
The
Journal
of
Economic
Perspectives,
17(4),
119-144.
doi:10.1257/089533003772034925.
Krueger, A., & Maleckova, J. (2002). Does poverty cause terrorism? The economics and the
education of suicide bombers. New Republic, 226(24), 27-27.
Lia, B. & Skolberg,K. (2004). Causes of Terrorism: An expanded and updated review of the
literature.
Norwegian
Defense
Research
Establishment.
Available
at:
https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/04-04307.pdf.
Lister, C. (2016). Jihadi rivalry: The Islamic State challenges al-Qaida. Brooking Doha Center,
19,
1-31.
Retrieved
April
11,
2016,
from
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/01/27-the-islamic-statechallenges-alqaida-lister/en-jihadi-rivalry.pdf.
Maloof, F. (2013, February 3). New threat from Sinai’s united jihadist. Retrieved July 29, 2015,
from http://www.wnd.com/2013/03/new-threat-from-sinais-united-jihadists/
Matusitz, J. (2013). Terrorism & communication: A critical introduction. Thousand Oaks, Calif.:
SAGE. Retrieved October 24, 2015, from http://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upmbinaries/51172_ch_1.pdf.

Published by Arab Journals Platform

71

Future Journal of Social Science Vol.1, Issue 1 (May 2022)

Mehmood, F. (2015, November 26). Spread of terrorism in North Africa - Diffusion of terror in
North Africa: A comparative case study (Rep. No. 1126489). Retrieved April 11, 2016, from
International Centre for Integration & Cohesion – website: http://integrityuk.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Spread_of_terrorism_in_north_Africa_blu.pdf.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016).
Global
Terrorism
Database.
Retrieved
from
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=sinai&sa.x=33&sa.y=26&sa=S
earch.
Pelham, N. (2012a, September). Sinai: The buffer erodes. Chatham House. The Royal Institute of
International
Affairs,
Retrieved
April
26,
2015,
from
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle
East/pr0912pelham.pdf.
Pelham, N. (2012b, October). Salvaging Sinai. Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre
(NOREF). Retrieved January 14, 2016, from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=154719.
Piazza, J. A. (2009). Economic development, poorly managed political conflict and terrorism in
india. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism [H.W. Wilson - SSA], 32(5), 406.
Piazza, J. A. (2011). Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism. Journal
of Peace Research, 48(3), 339-353. doi:10.1177/0022343310397404.
Piazza, J. A. (2012). Types of minority discrimination and terrorism. Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 29(5), 521-546.
Rabasa, A. & Peters, J. (2007). Ungoverned spaces: Understanding and reducing terrorism risks.
Santa
Monica,
CA:
RAND.
Retrieved
December
19,
2015,
from
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf.
Ralph, T. (2012). Egypt Army kills 32, arrests 38 more in Sinai offensive. Retrieved April 26,
2016,
from
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middleeast/egypt/120908/egypt-army-kills-32-sinai-offensive-gaza.
Regional influence on terrorism in Egypt - The Regional Center for Strategic Studies. (2015, July
5).
Retrieved
December
16,
2015,
from
http://www.rcssmideast.org/En/Article/286/Regional-influence-on-terrorism-in-Egypt#.VnF4dVxrWfQ.
Reuters/Stringer. (2014). Special Report: Egyptian militants outwit army in Sinai battlefield.
Reuters. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-sinaispecialreport-idUSBREA2F05020140316.
Revkin, M. (2013, September 2013.) Sharia courts of the Sinai - Foreign Policy. Retrieved April
23, 2015, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/20/sharia-courts-of-the-sinai/
Revkin, M. (2014). Triadic legal pluralism in North Sinai: Case study of State, Shari’a and Urf
courts in conflict and cooperation. Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, 13(1), 23-59.
Published by Arab Journals Platform

72

Karim Ashour: Selective State Penetration

Retrieved July 26, 2015, from https://mararevkin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/revkin-uclajournal-of-islamic-and-near-eastern-law-2014.pdf.
Revkin, M. (2015). Legal pluralism in North Sinai: Mapping the rise of non-state Islamic courts.
Yale Program on Governance and Local Development. Retrieved July 24, 2015, from
http://campuspress.yale.edu/pgld/files/2015/03/MaraRevkin_ISEdits.pdf.
Sabry, M. (2015). Sinai: Egypt's linchpin, Gaza's lifeline, Israel's nightmare. Cairo: AUC Press.
Sadeany, M. (2014, March 25). Poverty Map in Egypt's Provinces2013. Retrieved December 5,
2015, from http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/417230.
Said, A. & Elkady, K. (2013). The good, the bad, and the ugly of Egypt’s political transition.
Crown Center of Middle East Studies. Retrieved November 1, 2015, from
http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB70.pdf.
Schenker, D. (2015, December 16). Security challenges in Egypt two years after Morsi. The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved April 10, 2016, from
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20151216/104294/HHRG-114-FA13-WstateSchenkerD-20151216.pdf.
Schmid, A. P (2011). The Rutledge handbook of terrorism research. New York: Routledge.
Shay, S. (2014). Egypt and the threat of Islamic terror. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,
230.
Retrieved
April
11,
2016,
from
http://besacenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/perspectives230.pdf.
Siboni, G., & Barak, R. (2014). The Sinai Peninsula threat development and response concept. The
Institute for National Security Studies & The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at
Brookings.
Retrieved
March
28,
2015,
from
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/Sinai%20threat%20and%20response%20
-%20Siboni%20%20Ben-Barak_corrected.pdf.
Social Fund for Development. (2013, November 19). Poverty Maps: Geographic Targeting.
Retrieved
April
22,
2016,
from
http://www.sfdegypt.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=17f0b865-8ed8-47f4-a0feaa2dc0b5a277&groupId=10136.
Taspinar, O. (2009). Fighting radicalism, not ‘terrorism’: Root causes of an international actor
redefined. Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR) Quarterly Newsletter. SAIS
Review,
XXIX
(2).
Retrieved
September
17,
2015,
from
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2009/9/summer fall radicalism
taspinar/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar.pdf.
Tawhid wal-Jihad - The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. (2014, July 22). Retrieved August
1, 2015, from https://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/tawhid-wal-jihad/
TIMEP. (2015c, March 11). Monthly Briefing 5: February 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly
Briefing (Rep. No. 5). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East
Policy website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ESW-FebruaryBriefing-.pdf.

Published by Arab Journals Platform

73

Future Journal of Social Science Vol.1, Issue 1 (May 2022)

TIMEP. (2015d, April 16). Monthly Briefing 6: March 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly
Briefing (Rep. No. 6). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East
Policy website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MarESW3.pdf.
TIMEP. (2015e, May 14). Monthly Briefing 7: April 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly Briefing
(Rep. No. 7). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ESW-April.pdf.
TIMEP. (2015f, June 17). Monthly Briefing 8: May 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly Briefing
(Rep. No. 8). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ESW-May.pdf.
TIMEP. (2015g, July 22). Monthly Briefing 9: June 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly Briefing
(Rep. No. 9). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ESW-June15.pdf.
TIMEP. (2015h, September 10). Monthly Briefing 10: July 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly
Briefing (Rep. No. 10). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East
Policy website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ESW-July-2015.pdf.
TIMEP. (2015i, October 9). Monthly Briefing 10: August 2015- Egypt Security Watch Monthly
Briefing (Rep. No. 10). Retrieved April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East
Policy website: http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ESW-August2015.pdf.
TIMEP. (2015j, November 15). Egypt’s Rising Security Threat. Retrieved April 18, 2016, from
The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy website: http://timep.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Tahrir_Report_FINAL_WEB.pdf.
TIMEP. (2016, February 22). Egypt Security Watch Quarterly Report Oct – Dec 2015. Retrieved
April 18, 2016, from The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy website:
http://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ESW-Quarterly-Report-Oct-Dec-2015.pdf
Tuitel, R. (2013). The future of the Sinai Peninsula. PfP Consortium Quarterly Journal, 13(2), 7993.
Retrieved
December
10,
2015,
from
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25218/uploads.
Walton, O., Gerges, F., & Gilbert, H. (2012, September 20). Conflict, exclusion and livelihoods in
the Sinai Region of Egypt. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Retrieved
January 28, 2016, from http://www.gsdrc.org/publications/conflict-exclusion-andlivelihoods-in-the-sinai-region-of-egypt/
Watanabe, L. (2015). Sinai Peninsula: From buffer zone to battlefield (C. Nunlist, Ed.). Cent er
for Security Studies (CSS), (168), 1-4. Retrieved November 25, 2015, from
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse168-EN.pdf.
Wilayat Sinai - The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. (n.d.). Retrieved April 5, 2016, from
http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/wilayat-sinai/
Yaari, E. (2012). Sinai: A new front. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (9). Retrieved
December
16,
2015,
from
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf.
Published by Arab Journals Platform

74

Karim Ashour: Selective State Penetration

Appendix: List of Interviewees
Name
A Female Human Rights
Activist and Resident in North
Sinai
Abdallah Schleifer

Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat

Ahmed Sakr

Anonymous

Anonymous

Anonymous Bedouin

Anonymous Bedouin

Anonymous
EX-Radical
Islamist
and
Researcher
specialized in the Islam
Militant Movements
Anonymous
Political
Researcher Specialized in
Security Studies
Iman Ragb

Khaled Dawoud

Mohamed Salah

Olfa Al-Salami

Date and Place of the
Personal communication
Personal communication
via email, November 30,
2016
Personal
interview,
November 25, 2015 –
Cairo, Egypt
Personal
interview,
November 29, 2015 - Cairo,
Egypt)
Personal communication
via Viber, November 11,
2015
Personal
interview,
February 6, 2016 –Cairo,
Egypt
Personal interview, March
13, 2016 - Cairo, Egypt)

Personal
interview,
February 4, 2016 –Giza,
Egypt
Personal
interview,
February 4, 2016 –Giza,
Egypt
Personal
interviewNovember 30, 2015– Giza,
Egypt

Personal
interview,
February 3, 2016 - Cairo,
Egypt
Personal
interview,
December 1, 2015 - Cairo,
Egypt)
(Personal
interviewDecember 1, 2015 - Cairo,
Egypt)
Personal
interview,
November 30, 2015 –
Cairo, Egypt)
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